More than half of all US import relationships begin with less than $10,000 annually. The median relationship is observed to last just one year. The incidence and duration of these relationships are consistent with a matching model of international trade. The preponderance of small starting relationships reveals uncertainty present in formation of trade relationships. Initial size, reliability, and search costs matter and play an important role. Larger initial purchase results in longer relationships. Higher reliability and lower search costs lead to larger initial purchases and longer relationships.
Introduction
Much effort has been invested by trade economists to explain root causes of international trade. Many explanations have been proposed, including Ricardian comparative advantage, Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments, and Helpman and Krugman monopolistic competition. The majority of existing models explain why countries trade in the aggregate. However, there are few models that examine formation of trade at the product level. The main goal of this paper is to provide an empirical analysis of formation of trade relationships at the product level.
Formation of relationships is modeled following Rauch and Watson (2003) who
examine how a developed country buyer searches for an appropriate supplier from a developing country. Given the uncertainty present in international markets they find buyers elect to start some relationships with small purchases to test the supplier, while they start others with large purchases. Relationships that start with large purchases are more likely to be long lasting. This paper provides evidence a search model of trade formation is consistent with observed data and is not limited to case studies presented by Rauch and Watson (2003) . First, data support the model. A great majority of US import relationships commence with very small annual purchases with a median value below $10,000. 1 More than ninety percent of US import relationships start under $1,000,000. There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in formation of trade relationships. Most buyers choose to test suppliers via small orders and upgrade them to large orders if they prove capable. The smaller the initial purchase the shorter the relationship. Almost a half of the smallest relationships, those starting under $10,000, last only one year.
Only three percent of the largest relationships, those starting over $1,000,000, fail after one year. In addition to initial purchase size duration increases the more reliable the supplier and the smaller the search costs.
Second, implications of the Rauch-Watson model are more widely applicable to all trade relationships, not just to developed country imports from developing countries.
All US imports have similar characteristics -the majority of relationships start with small purchases and duration increases with initial purchase and reliability, while it decreases with search costs.
Third, the paper highlights an unexplored phenomenon in international trade.
The majority of trade relationships start with low values and are of short length.
Highly valued and long lasting relationships are a minority.
This paper contributes to a large body of literature using highly disaggregated trade data. Schott (2004) uses product level US trade data to find international competition in product markets has increased over time. Hummels participation in international markets. While related to this literature, this paper differs fundamentally by employing import rather than export data. An apparent shortcoming of this paper is its inability to capture cross-firm heterogeneity missing from product level data. As I will argue, this is not a debilitating shortcoming as firm-product level data would only make the results stronger. In addition, product level data highlight the significant dynamics which exist in international trade and are glanced over by firm level data. Besedeš and Prusa (2006a) contain an extensive discussion of differences between the use of product level import and firm level export data.
Besides offering an empirical confirmation of Rauch and Watson (2003) , the paper makes a contribution to the literature on duration of trade. Besedeš and Prusa (2006a, b) investigate duration of US import trade. They find trade at the product level to be very volatile, with the median duration of just four years. They find differentiated products exhibit much longer median duration than do homogeneous products, five versus two years. Although Besedeš and Prusa (2006b) also use the Rauch and Watson model, this paper is more faithful its setup, relates data more closely to the model, and focuses on the initial purchase-duration relationship.
Motivation for Empirics

A Model of Costly Search and Unknown Match Quality
The paper is motivated by Rauch and Watson's (2003) model of a buyer's search for a foreign supplier. They motivate their model by a desire to understand how developed country buyers make their decisions to cooperate with suppliers from less developed countries. While the original model is presented at the firm level, data constraints force me to recast the model at the country-product level. The buyer will be a developed country, the US, searching for a supplier of a product among developing countries.
The buyer's goal is to find a developing country supplier successful in supplying a large order. Suppliers differ in per-period production costs. The buyer must pay a search cost whenever a search is undertaken. After being matched with a supplier, the buyer immediately observes the supplier's per period cost. The supplier's success in fulfilling a large order is initially unknown. If the supplier is successful, a large order generates gross per-period sales for the buyer at the seller's per period cost. If the supplier is unsuccessful, gross sales are zero. Before a large order can be placed, the buyer must pay a training investment which will enable the foreign supplier to fulfill large orders. The training investment reveals whether the supplier will be successful.
After a match, the buyer has a choice between three options: place a large order, place a small order, or reject the supplier and search anew. If a large order is placed, the buyer pays the training investment, learns the supplier's ability, and positive profit results if the supplier is successful. Alternatively, the buyer can place a small order resulting in zero profit. Over a period of time a series of small orders reveal whether the supplier can successfully supply a large order. If the supplier is revealed to be successful, the buyer will pay the training investment and place a large order. If at any point the supplier is revealed unsuccessful or immediately rejected, the buyer returns to the pool and searches again. A successful relationship with a supplier gives the buyer access to a network of potential suppliers, which costlessly introduces the buyer with some probability to a new supplier. If the buyer decides to switch, it again must decide whether to start small or large.
In equilibrium buyers will place large orders with low cost suppliers. Intermediate cost suppliers will be tested with small orders before being upgraded to large orders.
High cost suppliers will be rejected. Rauch and Watson demonstrate two key characteristics of the equilibrium. First, relationships starting with large orders will have longer duration than those starting with small orders. Second, a decrease in search costs and an increase in reliability each increase both the likelihood of a large start and duration. 
Relating the Model to Data
The model describes how small initial purchases and short durations depend upon supplier characteristics. The five key variables -supplier's marginal cost, search cost, supplier reliability, training investment, and probability of being re-matchedare all primarily supplier or product characteristics. 
Verifiable Implications
The Rauch-Watson model provides an explanation why some trade relationships start small and others start large, why trade relationships may be short-lived, why duration may vary across suppliers, and how duration and starting size are related. It also implies some potential suppliers are rejected by buyers before any transaction takes place. These rejections are unobservable as only data on realized relationships are available. 4 Five verifiable implications can be identified. Since there is no available direct measure of reliability, the supplying country's level of development as indicated by its per capita GDP will be used as a proxy.
Suppliers with higher per capita GDP should have longer duration.
Implication 3
Goods with lower search costs will have a larger fraction of relationships that start large and will have a longer duration.
Given data constraints, country and product characteristics will be used to proxy for search costs.
Implication 4
The chance of a trade relationship ending will be the highest during the learning stage.
Empirically, failure rates should be high early in relationships, especially for relationships that start small.
Implication 5 A small fraction of successful relationships will be ended by buyers switching to a new supplier. The greater the reliability, the greater should the attrition rate be as it is easier/cheaper to switch to another supplier.
The risk of failure should decline significantly the longer the relationship. The risk of failure need not go to zero as a buyer might opt to start a new relationship with a different supplier. The opt-out possibility is less likely the lower are the costs of the current supplier. I will examine the reliability implication for the attrition rate of successful relationships at the end of the paper.
Results
The main focus of discussion is on TS data. All HS results are qualitatively similar and are available on request. I first investigate whether the implications of the Rauch-Watson model hold for developing countries as they postulated. Countries are classified as developing if they are not a member of the OECD. 
A First Pass
I provide a first pass at results by examining implications #1, #4, and #5 nonparametrically. Implications #2 and #3 can only be evaluated jointly with other implications by estimating a hazard model.
Starting small and starting large -Implication #1
Let us begin by examining the extent to which US buyers start relationships with large orders. Table 1 for HS data. The mean roughly corresponds to the 94 th percentile in both datasets, which implies the right tail of the distribution is dominated by a small number of very large relationships. However one chooses to define "small," the majority of US import relationships start very small, while a few start very large.
The second part of implication #1 is that the size of a trade relationship in the first year affects its duration. I estimate survival functions for relationships of different first year transactions using the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator. Trade relationships 13 are divided into five groups: those starting (i) with less than $10,000, (ii) between $10,000 and $50,000, (iii) between $50,000 and $100,000, (iv) between $100,000 and $1,000,000, and (v) with more than $1,000,000. About 53% of all relationships fall into the smallest group, while about 24%, 7%, 12%, and 4% fall in next groups respectively for both datasets. As depicted in the upper-left panel of Figure 1 estimates are a striking confirmation of the model: the smaller the initial purchase, the lower the probability of survival and the shorter the duration. Differences between estimated survival functions are statistically significant. However one defines a small purchase, relationships that start small will be of short duration.
Hazard rates -Implications #4 and #5
The last two implications concern the conditional probability of failure or the hazard rate. According to Rauch and Watson, early stages of relationships should be characterized by higher hazard rates as buyers determine whether suppliers can successfully deliver the order. Beyond the initial learning stage there should be a small number of failures stemming from re-matching.
Both hypotheses are borne out by data. Table 2 reports estimated hazard rates for both TS and HS data. The probability a relationship will fail is highest at its outset. More than a third of relationships fail in their first year. Beyond the first year the hazard rate declines rapidly. About 25-35% of relationships fail in the next two years. Thereafter, there is little attrition. Between years five and ten no more than 10% of relationships fail. Once relationships last more than ten years, the probability of failure in each subsequent year is around or below one percent. Even when suppliers prove to be reliable and relationships are long, there is still some possibility of the buyer switching to a different supplier.
The lower-left panel of Figure 1 depicts hazard rates across initial transaction size.
Relationships with larger initial transactions experience lower hazard rates at every point. Hazard rates never decline to zero as even the most successful relationships can fail when the buyer decides to switch to a new supplier.
Hazard Model Estimation
Results presented so far offer generally strong support for the Rauch-Watson search cost model. To evaluate the interplay of potential factors affecting the size-duration relationship, I estimate a stratified Cox proportional hazard model
where x denotes a vector of explanatory variables and β is to be estimated. Explanatory variables capture search costs, supplier reliability, relative costs of trading, and initial purchase size. The baseline hazard, h s0 (t), characterizes how hazard changes as a function of time and is different for each strata, s. Estimation is stratified by regions and 1-digit SITC industries.
Distance, common language, contiguity, and the number of potential suppliers are used to capture search costs. Distance may be correlated with costs of finding a foreign supplier. Greater distance is expected to indicate a more difficult search.
A common language dummy captures any advantages of English being the primary language of the supplier. There are two potential suppliers in 1972 and four in 1973.
Two measures of supplier reliability are used. The first and most direct measure is per capita GDP. It is assumed a supplier's reliability will be closely related to its level of development as proxied by per capita GDP. 6 The other measure, multiple spells, is more indirect and requires some explanation. Some trade relationships are observed for a period of consecutive years (spell 1), followed by a period of no trade, and then again observed for another service spell (spell 2). 7 There is no way to identify whether parties involved in the first spell are the same as those involved in the second spell.
If failure is at least partially related to country characteristics then the first failure makes a second failure more likely and indicates lower reliability. 8 Multiple spells are treated as independent by using a dummy variable for higher order spells. Alternative approaches toward multiple spells are considered in a robustness exercises.
Larger economies are able to trade more with the US due to their larger production capacity. Suppliers from larger economies are able to commence their relationships with US buyers with larger values, which would result in longer relationships. GDP of the supplier country is included to control for this effect. 9 To control for cost differences and changes in costs across suppliers percentage change in the relative real exchange rate and ad-valorem transportation costs are used. The change in the relative real exchange rate is constructed by first defining each country's exchange rate so an increase corresponds to a real depreciation. It is then normalized in each year by the average real exchange rate of all currencies relative to the US dollar and annual percentage changes are calculated. This gives a measure of how each country's currency changed relative to its competitors'. An increase in the measure reflects a country's currency has weakened relatively more than its competitors', making its product cheaper and less likely its relationships will be discontinued.
Transportation costs are measured as the cif/fob ratio for US imports as reported in Feenstra (1996) and Feenstra et al. (2002) . When calculated at the product level this ratio is a reasonable measure for transportation costs, as suggested by Hummels and Lugovskyy (2003) . Following Hummels and Lugovskyy I drop a handful of obserissue. This problem declines in importance the longer the duration of the first spell in a series of multiple spells, since the buyer has several years to be rematched with some other supplier in that country and upon failure of the first relationship may decide to switch to another country. 9 Both GDP and per capita GDP are measured in 1995 US dollars.
vations with unrealistically large transportation costs (i.e., those with transportation costs more than the value of the product being traded).
An agricultural good dummy is included as those goods are highly susceptible to temporary shocks such as weather which may increase the variability in initial purchases and duration of relationships. Two controls for the initial size of a trade relationship are included. The first and most direct control is the dollar value of imports in the first year. Second, dummies representing the same groups of relationships as in Figure 1 are added to the dollar value of the initial purchase. Dummies are used due to the skewness in the distribution of initial purchase. The initial purchase plays an important role as implied by the model. Relationships that start large experience lower hazard and longer duration. Compared to the smallest transactions relationships that start with $10,000 to $50,000 face about a 36% lower hazard; those starting between $50,000 and $100,000 face an almost 50% lower hazard; those starting between $100,000 and $1,000,000 face a 70% lower hazard, while the largest relationships have a 93% lower hazard. The actual value of the initial purchase has a small effect independent of size dummies, though it is not statistically significant. Without size dummies a $1 million higher initial purchase has an 80% lower hazard (column 1).
Benchmark estimates
Columns ( The effect of size variables is almost identical. The only significant difference between the two time periods is the change in product type dummies. Intermediate goods reverse in sign, while the estimate for agricultural goods is no longer significant. Table 3 offer strong support for the model: reliability and search costs matter, and size has a tremendously large effect on duration of relationships.
Results in
A more flexible alternative
Since the size of the initial purchase has a nonlinear effect, it is possible other exogenous variables have a size specific effect. The pure size effect may be mismeasured
by not allowing a size specific effect of every variable. Reliability and search costs may increase in importance for higher valued transactions. The top panel of Table 4 presents results from estimating the following specification Effects of explanatory variables generally do vary by size. The positive effect of distance is the strongest for the smallest starting relationships -hazard increases by almost 2% for each 1,000 kilometers. The effect is smaller for the next two groups and it reverses in sign for the largest two groups. This may signify that for suppliers far away, which are expensive and difficult to search, the buyer does not commit to a supplier unless it is fairly certain the supplier will prove to be successful.
Common language has no effect for the smallest relationships while lowering hazard for larger relationships at an increasing rate, up to 45%. The role of Mexico's border with the US increases with size. Smallest relationships with Mexico have a 17%, while the largest ones have an 82% lower hazard. The effect of the number of potential suppliers increases for larger relationships, from 0.004% to 3.3% lower hazard. The importance of search costs increases with initial size.
The effect of reliability, as measured by GDP per capita, increases with size, but does not have an effect for the largest starting relationships. Reliability as measured by multiple spells increases with size. Having been dropped once spells a death sentence for the largest starting relationships increasing hazard by more than 700%.
Larger economies face lower hazard the larger the initial transaction, though the range of estimates is small, between 9% and 11%. The effect of the change in the relative real exchange rate increases with size from 4% to 10%, but has no effect for the largest relationships. Ad-valorem transportation costs have a statistically significant effect only for the smallest and largest relationships. The largest relationships are particularly sensitive facing an 18% higher hazard for every 10% increase in transportation costs.
Even after controlling for the size specific effect of every explanatory variable relationships starting with smallest transactions still face the largest risk. Relative to the smallest relationships involving final goods, the largest relationships enjoy a 61% lower hazard. Larger relationships enjoy an inherent advantage over smaller ones.
Robustness
Several issues might bias the results: (i) measurement errors regarding the end of a spell, (ii) inability to observe the exact starting date for relationships that are active at the beginning of the sample, (iii) definition of size, and (iv) aggregation concerns.
Measurement errors and Multiple spells
There are two issues related to multiple spells. The first involves the possibility of mismeasuring the end of the preceding spell. The second involves the assumption of independence of multiple spells.
A short gap between two spells could be a result of a recording error or transactions too small to be recorded. If time between two spells is sufficiently short, then they may be more appropriately interpreted as one spell. I assume a one year gap between two spells is a result of a recording error and merge the spells creating one longer spell. Gaps longer than a year are assumed to accurately reflect failure. To illustrate suppose a country supplies a product from 1981-1983 and then again from 1985-1987.
The benchmark approach treats this as two independent spells, each three years long.
The gap-adjusted approach interpret this as one 7-year spell. The second column of Table 5 presents the gap-adjusted estimates. Results are very similar to benchmark estimates, which are reported in the first column for ease of comparison.
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Two alternatives are estimated to investigate the independence assumption. Analysis is limited to the first spell of each relationship eliminating every higher order spell.
A more restrictive approach analyzing only single spell relationships is also considered.
Results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 . While some estimated coefficients change in magnitude, results do not change qualitatively and are strikingly similar to benchmark estimates.
Starting dates
For relationships active in 1972 it is impossible to ascertain the exact starting date.
Benchmark analysis interprets all such spells censored, which may introduce bias since of those spells are already long-lived in 1972. I estimate the model excluding all spells observed in 1972. Results very similar to benchmark results are reported in column 5
of Table 5 .
Defining size
One difficulty in empirically investigating the Rauch-Watson model is the appropriate notion of initial size. Due to product heterogeneity it may be more appropriate to use market share instead of dollar value to define size. For some products $15,000 may be big and for others $1 million could be small. I calculate market share for each supplier in their first year and divide relationships into five groups so approximately the same fraction of observations fall into each group as under dollar value cutoffs.
The chosen market share cutoffs are: 0.4%, 5%, 20%, and 50%.
Estimates presented in column 6 of Table 5 are qualitatively similar to benchmark and other robustness exercises. The estimated effect of size is muted, especially for the largest two groups. The hazard rate for the largest group is 44% lower than for the smallest group. By contrast, the largest group has an 86% lower hazard in the benchmark case.
Two of comments are in order. First, even when using the relative size concept larger initial transactions have lower hazard. Second, results suggest the absolute size 24 of a transaction has a more pronounced effect on hazard. A supplier may be relatively big even though it may have only a few thousand dollars of sales. All else equal, this supplier is worse off than a relatively small supplier with a million dollars of sales.
Aggregation
In the preceding analysis trade relationships were defined using product level data.
The product level might be an overly fine parsing of data. A supplier may sell a variety of products that all fall within the same industry. Product level data would reveal this supplier has very short duration as its sales shift from one product to another.
At the industry level, however, one would observe the supplier experiences a long duration. The highly disaggregated nature of trade data might bias results toward short duration. Spells of service at the SITC 5-and 4-digit levels were computed using industry level data compiled by Feenstra (1996) I will return to this point shortly. 
A Final Word on Reliability
Reliability has a dual role in the Rauch-Watson model. More reliable suppliers should receive larger initial orders and have longer duration. However, holding the initial purchase constant, higher reliability may lead to higher hazard and lower duration.
With highly reliable suppliers it is easy to switch to a new reliable supplier as there is little uncertainty about its reliability. Comparing developed and developing country trade relationships with the US, one may be able to observe just that -at similar levels of initial transaction developing countries may exhibit lower hazard than developed ones as the cost of switching to a new generally less reliable developing country supplier is higher. Two pieces of evidence support this implication.
At the lower end of initial purchase distribution, the US commences its relationships with developed countries with lower values than with developing countries.
These developed country relationships are also strikingly short. At high levels of reliability it is very easy and cheap to strike up and end relationships. Hence, there is a large number of small and short relationships with developed countries even though they are highly reliable.
I offer Table 6 as the other piece of evidence. It presents estimates from one regression where each variable has a specific effect for developed and developing countries and for each initial size group. Results are presented in a nonstandard format due to the large number of coefficients. The top panel contains estimated coefficients for developed countries. This is the only specification which allows me to evaluate the dual role of reliability. Since most coefficients are qualitatively similar to previous specifications, I will focus only on those illuminating differences in final goods relationships.
The dual role of reliability is supported by data. there is a lot of economic activity they do not capture. Three-quarters of trade relationships begin with less than $50,000. This is an important point from a policy point of view. If only relationships that start with large purchases can be successful (long lasting and of high value), should policy makers invest any effort to help smaller businesses unable to start their relationships at large levels?
The goal of this paper was to highlight the extent of dynamics that exist at a 30 disaggregated level. Aggregate trade data are appropriate to investigate issues such as why countries trade. In order to understand how countries establish trade relationships and what factors are important disaggregated data must be used. Studies at the disaggregated level allow firms to properly evaluate costs and benefits of participating in international markets. Such studies will enable policy makers to construct better policies to help firms tap international markets. Results of this paper should help on both of those fronts. While this paper certainly should not be the last word on these issues, it provides a strong push and motivation to delve deeper into these issues.
A Data Appendix
All data are available from public sources. Developed Countries' Hazard $0-$10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$100,000 $100,000-$1,000,000 $1,000,000+ (1)- (5) and (7)- (8) 'First year value' denotes the dollar value of imports (millions) and Groups 2-5 are defined as in Table 4 . For specification (6) Developed Countries' Hazard $0-$10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$100,000 $100,000-$1,000,000 $1,000,000+ (5) and (7)- (8) 'First year value' denotes the dollar value of imports (millions) and Groups 2-5 are defined as in Table 4 . For specification (6) 'First year value' denotes import market share (%) and Groups 2-5 are defined as follows: Group 2 First year market share between 0.4% and 5% Group 3 First year market share between 5% and 20% Group 4 First year market share between 20% and 50% Group 5
Variable Source
7-digit TS
First year market share above 50%
Product level data Industry level data (5) and (7)- (8) 'First year value' denotes the dollar value of imports (millions) and Groups 2-5 are defined as in Table 4 . For specification (6) 'First year value' denotes import market share (%) and Groups 2-5 are defined as follows: Group 2 First year market share between 0.4% and 5% Group 3 First year market share between 5% and 20% Group 4
First year market share between 20% and 50% Group 5
Product level data Industry level data <$10,000 
